



## The World of Perception

*Maurice Merleau-Ponty , Oliver Davis (Translator) , Stéphanie Ménéché (Foreword) , Thomas Baldwin (Introduction)*

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**The World of Perception** Maurice Merleau-Ponty , Oliver Davis (Translator) , Stéphanie Ménéasé (Foreword) , Thomas Baldwin (Introduction)

'Painting does not imitate the world, but is a world of its own.'

In 1948, Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote and delivered on French radio a series of seven lectures on the theme of perception. Translated here into English for the first time, they offer a lucid and concise insight into one of the great philosophical minds of the twentieth-century.

These lectures explore themes central not only to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy but phenomenology as a whole. He begins by rejecting the idea - inherited from Descartes and influential within science - that perception is unreliable and prone to distort the world around us. Merleau-Ponty instead argues that perception is inseparable from our senses and it is how we make sense of the world.

Merleau-Ponty explores this guiding theme through a brilliant series of reflections on science, space, our relationships with others, animal life and art. Throughout, he argues that perception is never something learned and then applied to the world. As creatures with embodied minds, he reminds us that we are born perceiving and share with other animals and infants a state of constant, raw, unpredictable contact with the world. He provides vivid examples with the help of Kafka, animal behaviour and above all modern art, particularly the work of Cezanne.

A thought-provoking and crystalline exploration of consciousness and the senses, *The World of Perception* is essential reading for anyone interested in the work of Merleau-Ponty, twentieth-century philosophy and art.

## The World of Perception Details

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# From Reader Review The World of Perception for online ebook

## Apio says

This is a translation of the transcripts of radio talks that Merleau-Ponty gave, following the same basic outline as his book *The Phenomenology of Perception*. It is definitely easier to understand than the longer book, but also lacks the strength of that book, which offers far more actual intellectual tools for experiencing and using phenomenology as a way of understanding perception. In this book, the tools are barely there. In addition, the 28 page introduction (by a philosophy professor who has studied Merleau-Ponty) is, in my opinion, mostly a waste of space. It should have ended by page 11, since there was no need to explain Merleau-Ponty's radio talks. He used clear language in them. And the only reason the professor seemed to write the rest was so that he could point out where he thought Merleau-Ponty was wrong. This might have been interesting if he had made real arguments, but he didn't.

The simplicity of Merleau-Ponty's talks has its usefulness for those who want a general outline of his ideas, but they also show some of his limits very clearly, including a tendency for a kind of existential moralism. I would recommend those who seriously want to explore a phenomenological approach to understanding perception and their lives in the world instead read the larger, more difficult, but ultimately far more satisfying *Phenomenology of Perception*.

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## Justin Bailey says

"Here, for the first time, we come across the idea that rather than a mind and a body, man is a mind with a body, a being who can only get to the truth of things because its body is, as it were, embedded in those things." (43) Adapted from a series of radio talks in 1948, *World of Perception* gives a brief and accessible introduction to MMP's thought. The introduction by Thomas Baldwin was incredibly helpful in situating MMP's ideas within his time as well as his larger corpus. While I found the essays tantalizingly brief, it served its purpose in helping me discern whether to invest my time, money and energy in the work for which he is known, *Phenomenology of Perception*.

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## ?uboš says

Definitely the most easily understandable of Merleau-Ponty's works (at least those I came across). For me as a sort-of philosophy autodidact was this a very good entry-point to his thought. Or, more precisely, it helped me to find my way around his ideas, as I already came in touch with them a few times mostly in works of other authors, notably eco-phenomenology thinkers. I tried to start by reading *Primacy of Perception* and then jumped right to *The Visible and the Invisible* - not a good way to go, for sure.

Merleau-Ponty explains the basics of his philosophy in a very clear and straightforward way. Of course, it somehow disguises the depth and complexity of his thoughts, but isn't that one of the things phenomenology has always been blamed for? That they try to talk about such "common" and "natural" thing as perception and our "naturally experienced world" and just unnecessarily confuse everybody by their "unnatural" and over-complex terminology? (I'm simplifying, of course, hence the quotation marks.) From this point of view this book (and Merleau-Ponty's radio lectures in the first place) should be praised for bringing these - truly remarkable and important - ideas closer to people.

I don't want to go into detail about particular lectures, just two thoughts:

When he talks about how perceived phenomena cannot be fully exhausted by the means of a definitional description (the beginning of Lecture VI, also the whole Lecture III), that all the specific details are what gives the thing its own unique meaning, it came to my mind that today we're surrounded almost entirely by mass-produced things that are so alike, so identical, that no wonder that we still are not capable of the kind of perception phenomenology thinkers tried to rehabilitate. I'm pretty sure, that the specifics of my IKEA table are quite exhaustively expressed by its model's name. (OK, not totally, but you get the point...) I think that phenomenological thought is again very needed in these days, maybe even more than in the middle of 20th century.

Second thing that intrigued me was the last lecture, where Merleau-Ponty by his description of what he calls "modern thought" in fact envisions what we now call postmodernism. The ever-present plurality of opinions, options, properties, etc. But alas, while we quite learned to live (or at least strive) in such world \*rationally\*, we still do not embrace the plurality and ambiguity of the perception. So again: we should get back to phenomenological thought. And this book is a perfect entry-point.

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## David says

### THE WORLD OF PERCEPTION BY MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

#### EXPLORING THE WORLD OF PERCEPTION...(space)...lecture...2

in sociology as in geometry the notion of a single unified space entirely open to disembodied intellectual been replaced with the idea of a space which consists of different (regions) and has certain privileges and directions these are closely related to our bodily features..

be content with the works of art that leave open the possibility for a variety of interpretations we must learn to live, not only after the death of god,...but also without the dream of reason.

(maybe they ate both the same)...

now this was not penned in 2008..when we recognized the mistakes made..yet unsolved..

social,...political,...economical,,,, as each come to light...IT WAS PUBLISHED.IN 1948..

classical world & modern world... he quotes DAVID-HUME...discussion on ANIMALS v MANKIND...and then states that the (joke)... is on mankind if he thinks he is superior to all..

DESECRATES...stated that the perception is unreliable,...prone .. to distortion in the world around us...MERLEAU-PONTY,...the theme argument is rooted in the bodily experience of the perceived world people,...animals,... etc... therefore each reality only reveals its own aspects but,...are interchangeable,!!!..

in MEDITATIONS OF THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY...

nature teaches me that by sensations of pain,...hunger,...thirst... and so on that i am not merely present in my body.. as a sailor is present on the ship.. but that i am very closely joined and as it were intermingled so that (i am the body,...form of a unit....)..

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## Tim Pendry says

Mid-twentieth century revolutions in thought have overturned much of the basis for any easy acceptance of Descartes and later Kant as guides to life, with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as early pioneers in unravelling the presumptions of essentialism.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is a very significant figure in this context, not merely within modern continental philosophy but in preparing the ground for what looks likely to be seen as a much wider and consequent cultural revolution, one derived from the extension of the insights of the existentialist, phenomenological and hermeneutic schools, first into art and culture and increasingly into society and politics.

This slim volume represents seven radio lectures given by Merleau-Ponty in 1948. The form should warn you about the content. They are slight, an attempt to popularise complex thoughts and ideas, equivalent to the sort of 'Brains Trust'-type talks given by intellectuals like Bertrand Russell or JB Priestley in Britain (as well as the Brains Trust itself) around the same time.

They are of their place and time. Some of the ideas will seem oddly obvious to a later generation but the lectures were bringing ideas that were reasonably well understood at the leading edge of the French intelligentsia to the educated French middle classes.

Radio was an essential medium of public education at this time and Merleau-Ponty appears to be doing a reasonable job here of boiling down complex and radical thought to the level of a reasonably educated member of the French general public.

But the book could be slimmer. Thomas Baldwin's introductory notes add little to appreciation of material that stands on its own merits and his determination to put his own critique of Merleau-Ponty's claims is irritating when what we really want is an explication of what Merleau-Ponty was trying to get across to a mass audience - and why.

Similarly, the first four lectures are scene-setting potboilers. Complex research and thought is boiled down to short gobblets of information that are not always entirely clear.

The lectures only come alive, to become a useful summary of his ideas, in the last three: a sensitive critique of Cartesianism from what is clearly an existentialist point of view; how art must be seen as distinct from reality; and a powerful, short and, in my view, important critique of the assumptions of the Enlightenment.

To be honest, this book is for completists in French philosophy or for those interested in how philosophy was communicated to the French public in the vibrant 1940s. Merleau-Ponty's views are probably best investigated through more substantial works or through one of the very many general works on existentialism - even perhaps from Wikipedia.

Where the book is useful is in providing unusually succinct (for a working philosopher) expressions of his position. This reader is wholly persuaded by his approach. Merleau-Ponty seems to be describing not how educated people should think (as was the case in the 1940s) but how educated people actually think today, sixty years on.

This shows the extent of a revolution that marks out the wiser part of the liberal West today both from its ideological rivals overseas and from the fundamentalist version of liberal thinking that is fighting its own rear-guard action to preserve the dominance of its absolute values in a changing society.

Merleau-Ponty's legacy is the challenge being undertaken, as I write, to sustain in place some of the rigidities

and essentialisms that were the consensus in 1948. These still hold sway in the elites of the West (though not necessarily in the general population) and are the basis of all the 'grand projets' that are so damaging within Western politics - from the American Empire through Israel to the European Union.

In essence, Merleau-Ponty's project is an extended critique of classical rationalism (though not, it should be said, a call for the rule of unreason).

For Merleau-Ponty, the rule of pure reason is neither possible nor truly human because we are, as human beings, embedded in our perceptions. We must be seen in the context of our history and of social reality and its history - as well as of the constant negotiation of our position with our own drives and with other persons.

This is the middle ground between matter and intellect where we actually live. As he puts it, rather than accepting the Cartesian dualism of their being, here, a mind and, there, a body, we should see ourselves and others as minds with bodies - "a being who can only get to the truth of things because its body is, as it were, embedded in those things." Let the man speak for himself:

#### Lecture 5

" Humanity is not an aggregate of individuals, a community of thinkers, each of whom is guaranteed from the outset to be able to reach agreement with the others because all participate in the same thinking essence. Nor, of course, is it a single Being ... humanity is precarious: each person can only believe what he recognises to be true internally, and, at the same time, nobody thinks or makes up his mind without already being caught up in certain relationships with others, which leads him to opt for a particular set of opinions. Everyone is alone and yet nobody can do without other people ... there is no 'inner' life that is not a first attempt to relate to another person, In this ambiguous position, which has been forced on us because we have a body and a history (both personally and collectively), we can never know complete rest. We are continually obliged to work on our differences, to explain things that we have said that have not been properly understood, to reveal what is hidden within us and to perceive other people."

#### Lecture 6

" The meaning 'table' will only interest me insofar as it arises out of all the 'details' which embody its present mode of being. If I accept the tutelage of perception, I find I am ready to understand the work of art. For it too is a totality of flesh in which meaning is not free, so to speak, but bound, a prisoner of all the signs, or details, which reveal it to me. Thus the work of art resembles the object of perception: its nature is to be seen or heard and no attempt to define or analyse it, however valuable that may be as a way of taking stock of this experience, can ever stand in place of the direct perceptual experience."

#### Lecture 7

" In modernity, it is not only works of art that are unfinished: the world they express is like a work which lacks a conclusion."

" ... absolutely objective historical knowledge is inconceivable, because the act of interpreting the past and placing it in perspective is conditioned by the moral and political choices which the historian has made in his own life ... Trapped in this circle, human existence can never abstract from itself in order to gain access to the naked truth: it merely has the capacity to progress towards the objective and does not possess objectivity in fully-fledged form."

" ... if ambiguity and incompleteness are ... written into the very fabric of our collective existence rather than just the works of intellectuals, then to seek the restoration of reason ... would be a derisory response ... liberal regimes should not be taken at their word ... noble ideologies can sometimes be convenient excuses."

Merleau-Ponty's message in these lectures is optimistic, far from the doom-and-gloom often ascribed to those moving in existentialist circles at this time.

Contestability and ambiguity are not necessarily bad things to Merleau-Ponty because they permit self- and social creation that accords with our complex natures. He stands in opposition to rationalist and intellectual models that bend humanity into fixed shapes.

Not only God but Reason are 'dead'. This is to be embraced but not from a position of reactionary conservatism. On the contrary, while clearly highly critical of the Soviet model, he is equally critical of Liberal nostrums (as he should be). The strong implication is that we can change things for us personally and for society in a progressive way through embracing uncertainty and making humane judgements for which we must take personal responsibility.

Of course, it is hard not to see this as part of the same movement that embraced Sartre, De Beauvoir, Camus and Arendt and so it is - but Merleau-Ponty should, I believe, be considered differently. His humane phenomenological approach leads him to existentialist conclusions but it does not lock him into its 'system' (such as it is) or ideology.

His ideological approach is, in fact, anti-ideological. He is sensibly respectful of science and is determined not to be led by the nose by Sartre whose genius and ego may place him amongst the 'greats' of Western philosophy but who must always be taken with a pinch of salt as a guide to life. For Merleau-Ponty, life need not be 'absurd' if we do not wish it to be.

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## Karl Steel says

"To love reason...-to crave the eternal when we are beginning to know ever more about the reality of our time, to want the clearest concept when the thing itself is ambiguous--this is to prefer the word 'reason' to the exercise of reason. To restore [the Cartesian ideal] is never to reestablish; it is to mask." (82, and I don't doubt that the last sentence sounds much better in French).

Of course there's a lot of good here. It's short, first of all (especially compared to *The Phenomenology of Perception*), very, very clear (e.g., "We can no longer draw an absolute distinction between space and the things which occupy it"), and the introduction, by Thomas Baldwin (who edited the *Basic Writings* (Routledge, 2003) of Merleau-Ponty), is suitably impatient with MMP's lapses (e.g., MMP's exaggeration of the independence of works of art from referentiality). (The introduction, however, should not have omitted MMP's troublesome *Humanism and Terror* from its summary of his career).

Of course I can praise MMP for phenomenology itself. I'm glad to see pretensions of mastery confounded and a community of bodied selves replace the doubting individuals of Descartes. It is even at times a world that calls us into self-consciousness (65), where the world conditions us ("Humanity is invested in the things of the world and these are invested in it"). It also includes a chapter on "animal life" that argues that we should "live alongside the world of animals instead of rashly denying it any kind of interiority" and speaks against "project[ing] onto animals the principal characteristics of human existence." Yet it flits away from



these insights almost as soon as they're made.

The world it considers is a world primarily of objects, encountered from our individual, always shifting vantage points, and it is, above all, a world of other people. But its phenomenology is strangely unerotic, and throughout anthropocentric: it spreads the human out, but leaves it intact; and where I expected a bodied self in ecstatic motion in/with the world and other self-objects, I found a subject *considering*, and *considering its considering*. Let's blame existentialism for MMP's choice to discuss the bodiment of anger (instead of love, or eating) and for his references to the *burden* of being *called to action* in a "world which excludes neither fissures nor lacunae." But let's also blame "perception" itself, which doesn't consider *enough* what happens when the world looks back at us, when it touches us, when we discover ourselves *in* it rather than (just) perceiving it, when it ceases to be an *it*.

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## Ellen says

"So the way we relate to the things of the world is no longer as a pure intellect trying to master an object or space that stands before it. Rather, this relationship is an ambiguous one, between beings who are both embodied and limited and an enigmatic world of which we catch a glimpse (indeed which we haunt incessantly) but only ever from points of view that hide as much as they reveal, a world in which every object displays the human face it acquires in a human gaze."

"Trapped in this circle, human existence can never abstract from itself in order to gain access to the naked truth; it merely has the capacity to progress towards the objective and does not possess objectivity in fully-fledged form."

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## Stewart says

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "The World of Perception," originally published in 1948 with this English translation by Oliver Davis published in 2004, consists of seven lectures he gave for French national radio in 1948. Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a philosopher and a friend of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus although not as well-known as those other French philosophers.

These lectures are an accessible introduction to this philosopher's thinking, although they obviously are not a comprehensive account of his views. The introduction by Thomas Baldwin is helpful.

In these lectures, Merleau-Ponty says he wants us to "rediscover the world in which we live, yet which we are always prone to forget." This is the world of perception. It is not just that we often sleep-walk through life, not paying attention to our immediate surroundings presented to us through our senses. Merleau-Ponty argues that classical science had devalued the sensory world in favor of the scientific world of measurements and mathematics, the "real world" behind the "sensory illusions."

In contrast, he writes in "The World of Perception" that the sensory world is as "real" as the scientific world, and (I would argue) the world of science is dependent on our everyday sensory perception. Both ways of perception are limited and approximations of the "world-as-it-is," which we cannot fully know. In addition, not just philosophy but the 20th century theories of relativity and quantum mechanics reveal that there is ambiguity and chance at the basis of reality.

While wanting to put the sensory world in its rightful place, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the limits to what embodied and sense-dependent humans can comprehend of the universe, and this limitation includes that extension of our senses we call science.

“We are rediscovering our interest in the space in which we are situated,” he writes. “Though we see it only from a limited perspective – our perspective – this space is nevertheless where we reside and we related to it through our bodies. We are rediscovering in every object a certain style of being that makes it a mirror of human modes of behaviour. So the way we relate to the things of the world is no longer as a pure intellect trying to master an object or space that stands before it. Rather, this relationship is an ambiguous one, between beings who are both embodied and limited and an enigmatic world of which we catch a glimpse (indeed which we haunt incessantly) but only ever from points of view that hide as much as they reveal, a world in which every object displays the human face it acquires in a human gaze.”

It is not only modern philosophy that pushes us to pay better attention to our everyday world, Merleau-Ponty says, but modern art as well. In Chapter 6, he provides thought-provoking commentary on painting, especially the works of Paul Cezanne, the post-impressionist French artist. Merleau-Ponty insists that when we look at a painting or other work of art, we should perceive it as we would any other object in the world, without reference to other things. “So painting does not imitate the world but is a world of its own. This means that, in our encounter with a painting, at no stage are we sent back to the natural object.”

Music, Merleau-Ponty writes, is a form of art that refers only to itself, with the exception of program music. “Here we are unquestionably in the presence of an art form that does not speak.”

On movies, he is rather vague on what constitutes true cinematic art. He writes, “Cinema has yet to provide us with many films that are works of art from start to finish: its infatuation with stars, the sensationalism of the zoom, the twists and turns of plot and the intrusion of pretty pictures and witty dialogue, are all tempting pitfalls for films which chase success and, in doing, eschew properly cinematic means of expression.”

Even in these mere 83 pages, there are many ideas that provoke and prod the reader’s mind. I look forward to reading Merleau-Ponty’s longer works.

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### **Karl Hallbjörnsson says**

Concise and lucid but a little too arid and introductory for my taste. I should read some more MMP to fit this work in context with his other works though.

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### **Justin Evans says**

If only all philosophers had a text like this; MMP introduces himself and his thought very well in this series of lectures. I knew almost nothing about him going in, and now I feel ready to think through his harder works. Very readable!

The introduction was excellent, as well, despite the unpromising "summary of each lecture" format. Baldwin is sympathetic, but he also isn't afraid to point out MMP's failures, whether of factual understanding (his grasp of physics doesn't seem to have been particularly good) or reasoning (you can't analyze painting, music and literature in the same terms).

As for the thought itself, MMP seems to me to be a left-wing Heidegger variation. He is critical of 'science', which means something like analytical thought + materialism, and insists that human experience can only be properly explained if we give attention to 'perceptual' life (hence the title). Perception turns out to be very broad: looking at tables, yes, but also intersubjectivity, Stimmung, and so on. He's usually reasonable--making a plea to include 'perception' in our understanding of human experience, rather than insisting that

\*all\* human experience is non-cognitive. But sometimes he seems to lean too far in that direction, suggesting that "naive" experience is opposed to intellectual experience altogether, rather than insisting, rightly, that all experience is both intellectual and bodily. In Kantian cant, he is content to admit the existence and necessity of regulative ideas; he just doesn't think we should fool ourselves into thinking that those ideas are anything other than regulative, nor that they are sufficient for understanding.

I was also pleasantly surprised to see him applying all this to a specific time period: he is writing, he says, about a particularly modern way of understanding. But here we run up against philosophy's usual issue: on the one hand, MMP wants to laud the emergence of a new way of understanding (roughly, a more holistic and less 'classical' way) in modernity. On the other hand, he can't help himself, and insists that "modern consciousness has not discovered a modern truth but rather a truth of all time which is simply more visible--supremely acute--in today's world." So... if it's a truth of all time, why was it so unacknowledged until now? If we can come to understand this consciousness differently, why can't the consciousness itself be liable to change?

He also gets a bit carried away in a very French philosophical way (classical painting kills the "trembling life" of the world; Chinese (sic) rock gardens express "a preference for death"; art is always the attempt to create a self-sufficient object), but certainly isn't the worst offender in this regard.

Anyway, I look forward to learning more about MMP; anyone who can be this clear and interesting in such a restricted format can surely be interesting in more professional texts. And I do suspect that he'll tell me what I want to hear, things like this:

"To look at human beings from the outside is what makes the mind self-critical and keeps it sane. But the aim should not be to suggest that all is absurd, as Voltaire did. It is much more a question of implying, as Kafka does, that human life is always under threat and of using humour to prepare the ground for those rare and precious moments at which human beings come to recognise, to find, one another."

Reason, he tells us, is waiting for us; we'll never inherit it, but nor will we give up on it. Has anyone compared MMP with Adorno? That would be fruitful, I think.

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## **the gift says**

280218: third review. written 70 years ago and i am still inspired!

second review: i have read this before but it is this time, having read so much more m-p, that the concision and skill of this work is more apparent. perhaps because these brief spoken essays, these radio talks, no longer suffer the burden I ask that they answer in total his thought, that they can serve as do those clear, short, precise poetic rendering of zen Buddhist ideas, that they can serve both as intriguing intros and emblematic summations. for indeed, if you read on m-p, you will certainly learn his way that the world is and of, perception...

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## **Kyle David says**

A concise and lucid introduction to M-P's philosophy. As a collection of radio lectures, the book is quite

approachable. Recommended especially for those interested in either M-P's philosophy in particular or phenomenology in general. It's something like an outline of a phenomenological worldview. M-P touches on the nature of how we come to know things and how space, objects, animal life, other human beings, and art are experienced. Clearest expression of the phenomenological method I have come across.

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## August Denys says

I have not read any other work of Merleau-Ponty, and it seems that, whole some may be able to comprehend the lectures within this book from other experiences they've had in the past; however, this book is best seen as a companion piece to one that is interested in the whole of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. This stems from the fact that the arguments themselves do not appear to be fleshed out, yet only derivative from his major work, the Phenomenology of Perception.

I do recommend people read Merleau-Ponty just so they can experience his interesting take on the combination of Psychology and Philosophy through the paradigm of Phenomenology.

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## Merve ?im?ek says

Hiç bir toplu ya?am yok ki kendimiz olma yükünü omuzlarımızdan alsın ve bizi bir fikir sahibi olmaktan ba?i?ik kilsin; ama hiçbir 'iç' ya?am da yok ki ba?kasiyla ili?kilerimizin bir ilk denemesi gibi olmasın.

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## Banu Pluie says

O'ooo Euclides! It's too Liquid.

Al???lm?? ressamlar ba?tan kontrollü giriyorlar i?e. Tamamen önceden karar verilmi? bir anla?mal? uzam kabulüyle paletlerini ellerine al?yorlar.

Kar??lar?ndaki çokça nesneden birisine bak?yorlar önce, resmediyorlar. Sonra di?erine, sonra ötekine ayr? ayr? odaklan?yorlar. Ama sonuçta olu?an durumda resim, tek bak???n ürünü gibi yans?t?l?yor. Bu önceden karar verilmi?, deforme edilmi? bir uzam anlay???d?r.

Halbuki göz hangi nesneye odakland?ysa ona göre di?er nesnelerin durumu her seferinde de?i?mektedir. Ressam?n yapt??? bu görülenlerin ortalamas?n? yans?tmakt?r.

Uzla??msal yol arayan bu ressam, resimlerinde her?ey oylunda gibi görünse de alg?lay???n gerçek hakk?n? asla vermi? olmaz.

Ponty itiraz ediyor: “Ama alg?yla temas etti?imiz dünya kendisini öyle sunmuyor ki?” (1)

Ponty gibi dü?ünen, alg?lar?n elle uzla?t?r?lmas?yla bulunan sonucu reddeden ressam bizim gözümüzde perspektif sorunsal içerisinde ya da geometri bilmiyordur. “Hesap hatalar? var” deriz belki de ilk bak???ta. Ama asl?nda bu ortalama bak?? anlay???n? reddeden ressam, her noktadaki duyumu tek duyuma dönderme bile?kesi arayan ressamdan daha çok alg?yla senkron çal??maktad?r. Ve dahas?, alg?s?n?n ona söyledi?iyle

çelişmemektedir.

Konumu, vücudu olmayan saf zihnin seyrinde bu farklı noktaların farklı algılanması olmayacağından tek bir fotoğraf sahne oluşturmak olasıdır. Ama uzam dediğimiz şey homojen değildir, her boyutunda farklı derinliklerin olması gerçektir, saf zihnin göreceği eşzamanlı şeyler ortamı değildir. Dolayısıyla ancak vücutsuz ve konumsuz bir ressamın gerçek algısının böyle olabileceği söylenebilir bu durumda.

Gördüğümüz şeyi baktığımız yer ve anın bilincinde kabullenen ve bunu yansıtan, ne geometri bilmediğinden bunu yapacaktır, ne dikkat çekme derdindedir, ne de perspektife ya da klasik sanat anlayışına kabalık ediyordur. O gördüğüne sadık kalıyordur.

“Teknik ölçüme kendini adamı ve nicelik ağıyla yapışan bir çağda kübist resim, zihnimizden çok gönlümüze seslenen bir alanda dünyayla insanın sarmalıyla dolaşmasını kendince sessiz sakin anlatması sanki.” (2)

Düşümdeki her varlık ancak vücudumuz üzerinden erişilebilir; düşümdeki her varlık da böylelikle insan özelliklerine bürünüp bir ruh ve vücut karışımı haline geliyor.

Uzamın artık nesneyi nasıl ezip bükebileceğini, yer derinliğini nesnenin bazen nasıl da derinebileceğini görüyoruz.(3) Nesnenin kendisiyle mutlak bir özdeşlik içinde olduğu iddiası, biçimle içeriğin ayrık olduğu iddiası gibi silikleşiyor. Bu yeni fizik bakışın artık kabullenenlerin Euclides’in katı çerçevesinin tuzla buz olduğunu artık kabul etmesinin zamanı çoktan gelmedi mi?

Bunu fizikte ve psikolojide yavaş yavaş olduğu gibi artık her alanda kabul etmek zorunda değil miyiz?

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